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COMMENT
Legal and Professional Ethics: Protection of Client
Identity
I. Introduction
For over a decade, many prosecutors have favored the practice of subpoenaing
attorneys to testify before federal grand juries about their clients' communications.'
More precisely, these prosecutors are requesting that the subpoenaed attorneys reveal
the identity of a client so that the prosecutor can build a case against the client,' and
while trial courts usually issue an order requiring attorneys to reveal their clients'
identities, attorneys continually appeal these orders. The controversy lies in the
question: "When should the attorney-client privilege protect a client's identity?"
Most of the subpoenaed attorneys claim the attorney-client privilege on behalf of
their client, noting their professional and ethical obligation of confidentiality under
their state's rules of professional responsibility. The attorneys believe that they have
a duty to keep the client's identity confidential anytime disclosure of the information
is contrary to their client's desires, especially if revealing the information could
adversely affect the client. As a general rule, the attorney-client privilege does not
extend to protect a client's identity.' However, courts recognize at least three specific
exceptions to this rule: (1) the last-link exception, (2) the confidential-communication
exception, and (3) the legal-advice exception. Additionally, courts may protect a
client's identity on a case-by-case basis without citing a specific exception to the
rule.'
Despite these general principles, many attorneys continue to appeal court orders
requiring them to reveal their client's identity because of the inconsistency with which
courts apply the exceptions to the general rule. Because the attorney-client privilege
is the vehicle that encourages clients to truthfully and completely reveal information
to their attorney, a consistent model is needed to ensure that attorneys can adequately
1. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 204 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2000); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9
(MIA), 899 F.2d 1039 (1 lth Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.
1982); In re Burns, 536 N.E.2d 1206 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1988).
2. See cases cited supra note 1; see also Seymour Glanzer & Paul R. Taskier. Attorneys Before the
Grand Jury: Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect a Client's Identity, 75 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1070 (1984).
3. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that
every circuit acknowledges that the identity of an attorney's client is generally not protected by the
privilege); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 1960) (recognizing that confidential
communications between attorney and client are privileged, but noting that identity is a disclosure of fact
in the litigation process); see also 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORF, EVIDENCE § 2313, at 609 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
4. See Colman v. Heidenreich, 381 N.E.2d 866 (Ind. 1978); In re Kozlov, 398 A.2d 882 (N.J. 1979).
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represent their clients by protecting their clients' identities under appropriate
circumstances.
Part II of this comment gives a brief overview of the history of the attorney-client
privilege. Part Ell discusses cases that focus on protecting client identity, highlighting
cases decided within each of the three recognized exceptions. It also discusses cases
that protect a client's name on a case-by-case basis. It further discusses Rule 1.6 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled Confidentiality of Information, and
gives an analysis of several corresponding state bar association rules. Part IV
suggests alternative methods of protecting a client's identity and emphasizes the
problems courts have in applying the recognized exceptions to allow for protection
of a client's identity. Part V discusses the implications of these general rules for
Oklahoma and the Tenth Circuit.
1. History
A. Creation and Development of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The appearance of the attorey-client privilege dates back to the reign of Elizabeth
I, where it appeared as an unquestioned privilege.' The privilege, known as the
theory of the attorney's exemption, was objective and was based on "the oath and
honor" of the attorney rather than the apprehensions of the client.' While the
privilege did not extend to the client, the attorney could claim the privilege every
time he was asked information concerning his client.7
However, by the early 1700s, in the search for judicial truth, a new theory
developed. This theory emphasized the client's need for such a privilege.' Courts
began to believe that a client could only openly consult a legal adviser if the client
could exercise the privilege of confidential communications." It was this belief that
led courts to recognize that the privilege should belong to the client and not to the
attorney." The original attorney-client privilege only protected communications
received by the attorney from the beginning of the litigation at bar.'2 However, by
1870, the privilege covered any communication given to the attorney by the client in
the consultation for legal advice.
One of the first clearly stated arguments for the protection of attorney-client
communications came in 1943, in Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea:"
5. See Burns, 536 N.E.2d at 1208; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2290, at 542.
6. 8 WIOMORE, supra note 3, § 2290, at 543.
7. See id. The attorney was acting under a pledge of secrecy, and his first duty was to keep the





12. Id. § 2290, at 544.
13. See id. Open communication developed slowly because the old theory of only extending the
privilege to the attorney was not significantly challenged until 1801. See id.




If an attorney had it in his option to be examined, there would be an
entire stop to business; nobody would trust an attorney with the state of
his affairs. The reason why attornies [sic] are not to be examined to
anything relating to their clients or their affairs is because they would
destroy the confidence that is necessary to be preserved between them.
This confidence between the employer and the person employed, is so
sacred a thing, that if they were at liberty, when the present cause was
over that they were employed in, to give testimony in favour [sic] of any
other person, it would not answer the end for which it was instituted.
The end is, that persons with safety may substitute others in their room;
and therefore if you cannot ask me, you cannot ask that man; for
everything said to him, is as if I said it to myself, and he is not to
answer it."
Courts today continue to follow the reasoning of Annesley as the policy justifications
for the attorney-client privilege. Finally, while the modem attorney-client privilege
belongs to the client, the attorney retains the ability to claim the privilege for the
benefit of the client.
B. Principles Behind Protection of Communications - Civil and Criminal
1. Protection in Civil Cases
It has been suggested that the attorney-client privilege is not necessary because
"the deterring of a guilty man from seeking legal advice is no harm to justice, while
the innocent man has nothing to fear and therefore will not be deterred [from seeking
legal advice]."' However, in most civil cases there is no bright-line rule to
determine guilt or innocence." It is rarely the case in civil litigation that one side
is completely truthful and blameless while the other side has clearly acted unlawful-
ly.' Seldom will a civil case arise in which A will have absolutely no fear of
disclosure, while B will have all the fear and, thus, be hesitant to reveal any
information. 9 If the attorney-client privilege did not extend to all clients in civil
litigation, many clients would not consult an attorney because of something they did
that they thought might have been wrong. This fear would exist even if the person
had a strong foundation for a defense or a suit against someone else for the wrong
committed against them. Alternatively, many clients would consult an attorney but
only reveal beneficial facts. Because very few civil cases deal with clients who are
either completely innocent or completely guilty, the individuals in the middle of the
sliding scale of liability need the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege.
15.. Annesley, 17 How. St. Tr. at 1225, quoted in 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2291, at 545-46.
16. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2291, at 552.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. This is especially true in a civil case when some part or percentage of total liability may be
placed on both parties.
20021
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These clients should be able to rely on the privilege when revealing truthful
information to their attorney.
2. Protection in Criminal Cases
In the criminal context, it is unreasonable to believe that a lack of confidentiality
would deter an individual who has committed a crime from seeking representation.
The more probable result would be that the guilty party would still seek represen-
tation but would hide any self-incriminating details." If the guilty party withheld
vital information from his attorney, the justification for allowing the privilege would
be lost, the defense counsel could not fulfill his obligations to defend his clientand
to serve and help protect society, because without full disclosure from the client, the
attorney would lose the ability to exercise his full discretion in deciding both how to
handle a criminal case and whether some information should be revealed to prevent
future harm.
If the attorney-client privilege did not extend to criminal communications, society
as a whole would suffer. For example, in several instances an attorney has discretion
to reveal otherwise confidential information to prevent harm to individuals. However,
if the general attorney-client privilege were limited, the client would likely never
reveal an intent to commit a criminal act, and the attorney would not have the
opportunity to prevent harm to society. This is especially important when the
prospective harm could result in death or serious bodily injury.
C. Elements Used to Establish a Claim of Privilege
There are four elements that are necessary to allow an attorney to claim the
attorney-client privilege for a client. First, the person asserting the privilege must be
a client or intend to become one.2 Second, the communication must be made to a
member of the bar of a court who is acting in his professional capacity as a
lawyer.2 Third, the communication must relate to an issue for which the attorney
was consulted by his client (or prospective client), without the presence of strangers
and for the purpose of a legal opinion, legal service, or assistance with a legal issue,
and not for purposes of committing a crime.' Finally, the client must claim the
privilege and not waive it.'
A statement is not considered privileged, even if all the elements are present, if:
(1) the professional communication is made in furtherance of any criminal purpose;'
(2) a fact has been observed by the legal adviser in the course of employment,
showing that a crime or fraud has been committed since the beginning of his
employment, whether his attention was drawn to it by the client or otherwise;' (3)
20. See id. § 2291, at 552-53.
21. Id. § 2292, at 554.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see aLto In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1975).






the statement relates to facts that the attorney discovered other than in his role as
legal adviser;" or (4) the statement relates to testamentary communications in regard
to a will after the testator has died.' If any of these situations are present, the
privilege will not protect the client's identity, even if the case fits into one of the
recognized exceptions.
ill. Case Law
A. Case Opinions as to the Protection of Client Identity
I. General Rule
Generally, the attorney-client privilege does not protect a client's identity because
the client's identity is not the underlying reason that the client sought legal advice.'
Because the client's identity was not the subject of the communication between the
attorney and client, it is understood to have been readily disclosed and, thus, not in
need of protection." For example, if a client seeks an attorney to advise him on his
legal rights after the police arrest him for a crime; it is the protection of rights and
the prevention of punishment that motivate the communication. The client probably
readily disclosed his identity to the attorney in the initial consultation without
intending his identity to remain private.
2. Recognized Exceptions
a) Last-Link Exception
Although a client's identity is generally not protected by the attorney-client
privilege, the last-link exception can be used to protect a client's identity when
revealing his identity would be the last piece of information necessary to link the
individual to a crime. In Baird v. Koener,"' an attorney advised several accountants
who represented undisclosed taxpayers regarding the taxpayers' income tax." The
taxpayers did not want their identities revealed to the IRS." The attorney advised
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Vingelli v. United States, 992 F.2d 449, 453 (2d Cir. 1993) (indicating that a client's identity
is only generally protected when the disclosure, in substance, would be a disclosure of the confidential
communications between attorney and client); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9 (MIA), 899 F.2d 1039,
1043 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (requiring disclosure of client identity because client did not seek legal advice
anticipating that his name would be kept confidential); United States v. Garland, No. CIV. 191-CV-2267-
ODE, 1992 WL 138116 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 1992) (requiring law firm to disclose identities of clients who
made cash payments to law firm in excess of $10,000).
30. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 204 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2000). But see In re Burns, 536
N.E.2d 1206 (Ohio Ct. Corn. PI. 1988) (protecting the identity of a perpetrator of sex-related crimes
where client sought advice as to whether to reveal his identity).
31. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
32. Id. at 626. In Baird, the accountants contacted the attorneys as agents of the taxpayers. The
attorney never met with the taxpayers nor did he ever learn their names. Id.
33. Id.
2002]
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the accountants to anonymously pay the taxes in order to protect the taxpayers in
case they were criminally charged in the future.4
The accountants told the attorney that their clients owed the IRS $12,706.85 in
back taxes and interest." The attorney then sent a cashier's check for the amount
to the District Director of Internal Revenue, with a letter stating that the cashier's
check represented amounts due, for some past years, from one or more taxpayers,
whose identity he did not know.3' The letter also correctly informed the District
Director that there was not a current investigation in progress by the IRS."
The following year, a special agent for the IRS issued a summons requiring the
attorney to identify all the parties on whose behalf the attorney sent the cashier's
check. ' The attorney refused to disclose any of the identities, claiming such
information was a privileged communication."' At a hearing, the district court found
the attorney guilty of civil contempt for refusing to identify the individuals.' The
attorney was committed to custody until he complied with the order. However, a stay
was granted to permit his appeal.4' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after a
thorough discussion of the privilege and the policy behind it, noted that a client's
identity is seldom considered a matter communicated in confidence.'2 However, the
court further reasoned:
The name of the client will be considered privileged matter where the
circumstances of the case are such that the name of the client is material
only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt on the part
of such client of the very offenses on account of which the attorney was
employed...
In holding that the attorney was not required to disclose the identities," the Baird
court noted that the government could only use the clients' names for one purpose -
to ascertain which taxpayers might have been delinquent and to check their tax
records." The court further noted that the voluntary nature of the payments
indicated a belief that more taxes, interest, or penalties were due than the original





38. Id. at 627.
39. Id. The attorney specifically declined to name the taxpayers on the ground that he did not know
their names. Further, he declined to identify any of the taxpayers' agents on the ground that any
information revealed by such individuals was revealed as a privileged communication. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 629.
43. Id. at 633 (alteration in original) (quoting 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 283, at 803 (1957)).
44. Id. at 635.
45. Id. at 633.
46. Id. The court noted that it was the taxpayers' feelings of guilt that prompted them to consult an








Baird, although often cited as precedent, can be distinguished in several ways from
most cases in which an attorney is subpoenaed to disclose his client's identity. First,
in Baird there was not an investigation or litigation underway at the time the money
was sent to the government. Second, if not for the action on the part of the
taxpayers, the government might never have determined that the individuals owed
back taxes. Third, the attorney in Baird claimed not to know the identities of his
clients, because he acted on their behalf through their agents, the accountants, and
never met any of the taxpayers in person.
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), ' the Fifth Circuit altered the Baird
exception. In Jones, the government subpoenaed several attorneys to appear before
a federal grand jury investigating the possible narcotics and income tax violations of
several individuals.' Each of the attorneys refused to identify clients who might
have paid the legal fees of the individuals suspected of criminal activities." The
attorneys stated that their unidentified clients made communications to them in an
atmosphere of confidentiality." The Jones court noted, "[i1t is readily apparent the
[attorneys] were called to testify before the grand jury for the purpose of
incriminating their undisclosed clients as to privileged communications, perhaps to
the point at which indictments could be returned against those clients."'2 Jones
broadens the Baird exception by allowing an attorney to protect a client's identity if
it may substantially link the client to an incriminating event or transaction, while the
Baird last-link exception only allows protection of the client's identity if it is the last
piece of information needed to link the client to the crime.
In broadening the Baird exception, the Jones court stated that "information, not
normally privileged, should also be protected when so much of the substance of the
communications is already in the government's possession that additional disclosures
would yield substantially probative links in an existing chain of inculpatory events
or transactions.""
Several years later, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick)," the Fifth Circuit
narrowed the Baird exception. The court, misquoting the Jones rule, noted that it
would recognize an exception "when the disclosure of the client's identity by his
attorney would have supplied the last link in an existing chain of incriminating
thought that the attorney would discover their clients' identities and then disclose those identities to the
IRS, it is likely that the accountants would never have contacted the attorney. Id.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
49. Id. at 668.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 669.
52. Id. at 672-73.
53. Id at 674 (emphasis added). The last-link exception is generally refretnced as it appears in
Baird and is less often supported by the "substantially link" language of Jones.
54. 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982).
2002]
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evidence likely to lead to the client's indictment."" As courts continue to narrow and
expand the original Baird last-link exception, it grows increasingly difficult for
attorneys to conclude how a court will define the last-link exception in any given
case.
b) Confidential-Communication Exception
The Ninth Circuit intertwined the last-link exception with the confidential-
communication exception in In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury
(Alexiou).' In Alexiou, an attorney deposited money in his law firm's bank
account." The deposit included a $100 counterfeit bill." The Secret Service,
investigating an ongoing counterfeit scheme, contacted the attorney and requested the
name of the person who gave the attorney the counterfeit bill. 9
The attorney stated, in a letter to the Assistant United States Attorney, that the
client who gave him the $100 bill had retained him for services relating to several
traffic violations and a misdemeanor assault charge."' The attorney further explained
that while the client had made no disclosure as to the source of the money, the
attorney could not disclose the identity of his client because the state bar association
informed him that such disclosure would violate the attorney's duties under the rules
of professional conduct."
Refusing to protect the client's identity, the Alexiou court stated that to qualify for
the protection of the attorney-client privilege, the client's identity must be "'in
substance a disclosure of the confidential communication in the professional
relationship between the client and the attorney."" The Alexiou court further
explained that the exception might operate to protect a client's identity "if the
disclosure were the last link in the chain of testimony necessary to convict the
client."
The court noted that the exception did not apply in the case at bar because the
attorney was not representing the client on the counterfeiting matter." The court
also noted that the client's identity was not the last link in the chain necessary to
indict the client, because the government still had to prove that the client used the
counterfeit bill with knowledge that it was fake and with the intent to defraud.' The
Alexiou court stated that many innocent people pass counterfeit bills without their
knowledge, and it indicated that the client who paid the attorney might be such a
55. Id. at 1027 (emphasis added).
56. 39 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 1994).





62. Id. at 976 (quoting In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983)).
63. Id.
64. See id.




person.M As such, the court found no reason to protect the client's identity from
disclosure.'
In Colton v. United States," the Second Circuit noted that the attorney-client
privilege extends only to the substance of the matters communicated to the attorney
in his professional capacity." The court stated that an attorney must disclose a
client's identity, even if the fact that the individual retained counsel may be used
against the client." Although the court did not adopt a version of the last-link
exception, it did cite Baird when it noted that an exception should be made when
there are "circumstances under which the identification of a client may amount to the
prejudicial disclosure of a confidential communication, as where the substance of a
disclosure has already been revealed but not its source. ,o
In 1984, in In re Shargel," the Second Circuit foreshadowed its future
jurisprudence regarding the confidentiality of a client's identity. The court, in
deciding not to expand the exception beyond the previously recognized confidential-
communication exception, noted that a broad privilege against the disclosure of a
client's identity would provide a shield for criminal acts." In Shargel, a federal
grand jury subpoenaed an attorney to produce records of any monies or property
transferred to him by or on behalf of individuals who had been indicted for violating
the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).'4 The
government sought the information to use as evidence of "unexplained wealth," tax
law violations, and payments of illegal fees by "benefactors."" The attorney argued
that revealing the information requested would entail divulging communications that
would indicate that his client had a criminal problem.' In the case, each client
contacted the attorney shortly after the alleged events underlying the RICO
indictment."
The court noted that the attorney-client privilege encompasses only the com-
munications made in confidence that are necessary to obtain legal advice." The
court stated that the attorney-client privilege historically arose at the same time as the
privilege against self-incrimination." The court emphasized that during the "point-
66. Id. at 976.
67. Id. at 977.
68. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962).
69. Id at 637.
70. Id.
71. Id (emphasis added). Although Colton states the general exception for a confidential
communication, in Vingelli v. United States, 992 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993). the court described Colton as
an example of the substantial-disclosure exception. Id. at 453.
72. 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
73. See id at 64.




78. Id. at 63.
79. Id.
2002]
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of-honor" period' of history the reluctance of an attorney to incriminate his client
was never a valid reason to invoke the attorney-client privilege."'
The Shargel court also discussed several reasons not to protect a client's identity.
The court viewed the disclosure of the client's identity in a different light from
communications made by the client to explain a problem and seek legal advice.'
The court noted that while some clients may avoid seeking legal advice for fear that
their identity would not be protected, requiring an attorney to disclose his client's
identity would not prevent the person from obtaining competent legal represen-
tation. 3 The court noted that not protecting a client's identity prevents individuals
from hiding behind the shield of the attorney-client privilege once they have
confessed to a crime and revealed their identity- to the attorney.
Over ten years later, in Vingelli v. United States," the Second Circuit limited the
protection of the client's identity "to those circumstances where its disclosure would
in substance be a disclosure of the confidential communication between the attorney
and client. ' In Vingelli, the court refused to protect the identity of a client who
gave his attorney money to send to a second attorney to defend an individual on drug
charges."' The court stated that revealing the client's name did not reveal his
purpose for hiring the attorney.' The court reasoned that because clients may have
several reasons for hiring attorneys, the client's fear of guilt by association did not
show that revealing the information would be detrimental to the client."
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena," a community organization retained a law firm
to help stop drug activity on certain property within the community. ' The law firm
sent two letters to the recorded property owner threatening litigation if the owner did
not stop the drug activity occurring on the property.' In response, the firm received
an unexpected letter from a previously uninvolved attorney.9 The letter stated that
the attorney's client was not the current owner of the property, but that the client
would try to retitle the land in his name and deal with the drug activity problems."
80. See supra Part lI.A and accompanying notes.
81. Shargel. 742 F.2d at 63.
82. See id. at 63-64. The court explained that while the attorney's affidavit to the court volunteered
a connection between his six clients and the subsequent RICO proceedings, the connection could not
have been inferred from a mere disclosure of the clients' identities and fee information. The court did
suggest, however, that if any or all of the clients had met with the attorney as a group instead of having
individual consultations, the inference would have been greater that their names were confidential
communications. See id at 64.
83. See id. at 63.
84. 992 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993).
85. Id. at 453.
86. Id. at 451,454.
87. See id. at 453
88. Id.
89. 204 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2000).







The government, in connection with an ongoing investigation of the activities on
the property, subpoenaed the attorney, seeking the identity of his client involved with
the potential acquisition of the property." The attorney moved to quash the
subpoena, arguing that disclosure of his client's identity would reveal his client's
purposes for hiring the attorney and would, as a result, disclose confidential attorney-
client communications.' The attorney further indicated that the client requested that
the attorney not reveal the client's identity without first obtaining consent."
The Fourth Circuit found that a client's identity is only privileged if its disclosure
would reveal a confidential communication. 7 The court explained, however, that
when a client authorizes disclosure, such communications are no longer confiden-
tial.'* The court found that the client requested that the attorney send the letter to
the law firm indicating the client's plans for the property in order to postpone
litigation so that the client could complete his objectives." The court further noted
that, to the extent the letter indicated the client's motives or purposes in relation to
the property, these communications ceased to be privileged once the attorney sent the
letter at the client's request." The court held that the client's identity was not
protected under the confidential-communication exception because the client
authorized the attorney to reveal his motives and purposes behind the confidential
communication when he instructed the attorney to send the letter.""
c) Legal-Advice Exception
In D'Alessio v. Gilberg,"o a New York court held that the client's identity
constitutes a confidential communication, which is protected by the attorney-client
privilege." The court found that the identity was confidential because the
disclosure would reveal the client's involvement in a previously committed crime,
which was the reason he sought legal advice."0
In D'Alessio, a victim of a hit-and-run accident died of injures he sustained."
The administratrix of the decedent's estate learned that an individual who may have




97. Id. at 522.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. d. Here, the court noted that the attorney had, in part, been hired to convey information to a
third party, rather than to provide legal advice to the client, Id The court stated that "when a client hires
an attorney to take public action[] on the client's behalf - (here by] sending [a] letter... in order to
avoid a lawsuit - the [attomey-client) privilege does not extend to the client's identity once that...
action [has] taken" place. Id
101. Id. at 523.
102. 617 N.Y.S.2d 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
103. Id. at 486.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 484.
106. Id. at 485.
2002]
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driver, the administratrix applied to the court for permission to depose the
attorney." The court ordered the attorney to appear at trial for examination of his
client's identity.'" The attorney appealed."'
Reversing the lower court's holding, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, noted that while a client's identity is generally not protected, it may qualify
as privileged information "'where disclosure might be inappropriate because
inconsistent with the trust and duty assumed by an attorney.."' The court noted
that in the current case the client's identity was a confidential communication because
his possible involvement in a crime was the reason he sought legal advice."'
The court concluded by acknowledging that allowing the attorney-client privilege
in such situations may allow the guilty party to escape unpunished."' However, it
stated, '[This] is an evil ... which is considered to be outweighed by the benefit
which results to the administration of justice generally.."". This conclusion stands
in sharp contrast to the Shargel court, which opted against providing a shield to such
a client.
The New York Supreme Court recognized the legal-advice exception in Neugass
v. Terminal Cab Corp."' In Neugass, a passenger in a taxicab was injured when
the cab collided with another cab."' At the time of the accident, the passenger did
not obtain enough information to identify the second cab. However, the passenger
later obtained an order from the court for the pre-trial examination of the defendant
- the driver of the taxicab in which she was riding - for the purpose of filing a
complaint against the second taxicab owner."6 The order required the defendant's
attorney to reveal the name and address of the owner of the second cab involved in
the accident."7 The attorney, hired by an insurance company to defend suits against
its insured, claimed that the attorney-client privilege protected the requested infor-
mation."' He claimed the privilege because the second cab owner, also a
policyholder of the insurance company, had contacted the attorney about the
policyholder's involvement in the accident.""
The injured passenger claimed that this disclosure was made to the attorney as an
employee of the insurance company and not as a communication between the




110. Id. (quoting In re Jacqueline F., 397 N.E.2d 967, 971 (N.Y. 1979)).
III. Id. at 486.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 367 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1934))
114. 249 N.Y.S. 631 (N.Y. Sup. Q. 1931).
115. Id. at 631.
116. Id. at 631-32.







had hired the attorney was immaterial because the attorney clearly acted as counsel
for the policyholder.' Further, the court noted that the second cab owner reported
his involvement to the attorney in the attorney's professional capacity, thus fulfilling
the elements necessary for the attorney-client relationship."
In protecting the identity of the second cab owner, the court stated:
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of
professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to
a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such
advice or aid: And whenever the communication made, relates to a
matter so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to
afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by the client,
then it is privileged from disclosure.'
The Washington Supreme Court recognized the legal-advice exception in Dietz v.
Doe.?" In Dietz, an individual died when his car collided with a dump truck that
was trying to avoid hitting a second car." The driver of the second car never went
to the authorities; however, a local newspaper reported that an attorney acknowledged
that the motorist had retained his services. t
In denying a motion to compel disclosure of the client's identity, the trial court
stated that identifying the individual would implicate him in the accident." On
appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals stated that the evidence showed that the
client's identity was a confidential communication given to the attorney for the
purpose of keeping such identity secret from all other parties connected with the
accident." The Washington Supreme Court noted that Rule 1.6(a) of the Rules of
Professional Conduct requires an attorney to keep the confidences and secrets of his
client.2'
Recognizing an exception to the general rule of nonprotection, the Dietz court
defined the legal-advice exception as one "which bars disclosure 'where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of
such information would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which
the legal advice was sought."""
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. ld. at 634 (citations omitted) (quoting Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394, 399 (1880)).
124. 935 P.2d 611 (Wash. 1997).
125. Id. at 613.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 614.
128. Dietz v. Doe, 911 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
129. Dietz, 935 P.2d at 614 n.3.
130. Id. at 617 (quoting United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977)).
In Dietz, the Washington Supreme Court found that the trial court lacked adequate factual basis to
determine whether an attorney-client relationship existed and remanded the case to the trial court for
determination of the issue. Id at 619.
20021
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
d) Special Cases for Protection of Client Identity
Several courts have addressed the issue of the protection of the client's identity
without specific reliance on one of the three exceptions to the general rule, but
instead have granted an exception to the general rule on a case-by-case basis. In
Miller v. Begley,' an attorney received a call from a man who thought he had been
involved in an accident.' The man did not remember what he hit or where the
accident took place.' The attorney investigated the matter but did not locate any
reports of a hit-and-run accident occurring during the suspected period.'" During
a conversation with another individual, the attorney discovered the accident in which
his client had been involved.' 5
The injured party learned that the attorney might have information of another
vehicle involved in the accident.'" During a deposition, the attorney refused to
identify the individual who contacted him regarding possible involvement in the
accident."'
The Miller court, in denying the motion to compel the disclosure of the client's
identity, did not indicate that it was recognizing a specific exception to the general
nonprivileged information rule. However, the court's decision can be read to
recognize all three exceptions. In addressing the facts in Miller, the court stated,
The reason a client would go to an attorney instead of the law enfor-
cement authority for this information would be to protect his identity. If
the attorney reveals the identity of his client, he would expose the client
to both civil and criminal liability, regardless of any defense he might
proffer at trial.' 38
This statement acknowledges the protection of the client's identity if such disclosure
might link the client to the crime. The court further stated, "[when] the client's
identity becomes integrally involved in the matter about which he seeks the attorney's
advice... the identity is covered by the privilege."'1 9 This language acknowledges
the legal-advice exception. Finally, the last paragraph of the opinion arguably
recognizes the confidential-communication exception. The Miller court reasoned that
"[u]nder the facts of this case ... this court is... of the opinion that the confidential
revelation of the client's identity to [the attorney] was a privileged com-
131. 639 N.E.2d 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
132. Id. at 139.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 140.
136. Id. Passenger (the injured party) named both the owner and the operator of the motorcycle as
defendants in the lawsuit. Id. at 139.






munication."'" Therefore, an attorney in Ohio might use this case as support for
recognition of any of the three discussed exceptions.
In Colman v. Heidenreich,'" a male client revealed to his attorney that one of the
client's female friends was the hit-and-run driver who had injured a long-distance
runner. The runner was in the process of suing an innocent individual. "2 The
attorney informed the prosecuting attorney in the criminal trial that the accused
individual was not the guilty party.' In rejecting a request for the identity of the
guilty party, the attorney refused to disclose the information, claiming that the hit-
and-run driver was also his client.'" The attorney asserted the attorney-client
privilege when the court ordered him to reveal the identities of both his male client
and his client's female friend. "'
The trial court first addressed whether the "female friend" was indeed a client of
the attorney." The attorney testified that he had represented the man and the
woman both individually and in joint situations but that the man often acted on
behalf of the woman. " ' He further testified that although this issue was not the
central topic of the consultation with his male client, the attorney did give his male
client general legal advice regarding the hit-and-run accident.'" Further questioning
of the attorney revealed that the attorney never spoke directly with the woman
regarding the matter.'" The trial court ordered the attorney to reveal the names of
both his male client and the client's female friend." The court of appeals reversed
the trial court's decision and ordered the trial court to invoke the attorney's previously
requested protective order for both of the individuals' identities."'
The Supreme Court of Indiana, while recognizing the confidential-communications
exception, devoted much of its opinion to determining whether the elements
necessary to establish the attorney-client privilege were present. In holding that the
attorney must reveal the woman's identity only,"' the court noted: (1) the woman
had not asked the attorney for advice or legal assistance in the matter; (2) the woman
did not ask her male friend to seek legal assistance on her behalf; (3) the male client
was not acting as an agent of the female client; (4) there was no "confidential
relationship" between the female and the attorney regarding the matter; (5) the male
client made the remarks as an aside to the main purpose of the meeting with the
attorney; and (6) because this communication "could not reasonably be intended to
further the purpose of the conversation," the name of the woman revealed during the
140. Id.
141. 381 N.E.2d 866 (Ind. 1978).




146. Id. at 869-71.
147. Id. at 869.
148. Id. at 870.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 868.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 872.
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conversation was not privileged. "' The court further stated that when a client
makes remarks that do not further the purpose of the conversation at hand, these
aside communications are not privileged."
In In re Kozlov," a client contacted his attorney regarding the client's duty to
reveal his knowledge of information that would affect the validity of a recent
criminal conviction and the integrity of the administration of justice.'" The
evidence supplied by the client would have shown that an individual was deprived
of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial."7 The client shared his knowledge
with his attorney under the stipulation that the attorney not disclose his identity.' "
The Kozlov court, in protecting the client's identity, noted that the attorney-client
privilege only covers a client's identity when the privilege outweighs the public's
interest in the search for truth.'" The court emphasized that whether the client's
identity should be protected is based on a balancing test weighing the client's interests
in privacy against the public's interest in ensuring justice.'" The court concluded
that when there is a legitimate need to discover information a client desires to keep
shielded, the party requesting the shielded information must show "by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, that . . . the
information ... [clould not be secured from any less intrusive source."'
B. Rules of Professional Conduct
1. Judicial Commentary
As noted in Alexiou, attorneys are hesitant to reveal their clients' identities in many
cases because of their duties under the rules of professional responsibility. Courts
deal with the issue of an attorney's duty under these rules in varying ways. In In re
Burns," a man who raped one woman and exposed himself to another contacted
an attorney."3 The attorney checked with the local police department to determine
if either woman had reported the incident.'" Later, a grand jury asked on whose
behalf the attorney made the inquiry to the police departments." ' The attorney
stated, "I must refuse to answer the question because I was acting on behalf of a
client.., and my client is asserting the attorney-client privilege."'" The court ruled
153. Id. at 871-72.
154. Id. at 872. But see id. at 872-73 (DeBruler, J., dissenting) (stating that because neither the
client nor the attorney considered the information as a "voluntary aside" and because the attorney
provided legal advice, such information should be deemed a confidential communication).
155. 398 A.2d 882 (N.J. 1979).
156. Id. at 883.
157. Ud
158. Id.
159. ld. at 886.
160. Id. at 887.
161. Id.
162. 536 N.E.2d 1206 (Ohio Q. Corn. Pl. 1988).







that the attorney could not be compelled to reveal his client's identity because the
identity was a confidential communication."
The court devoted a great deal of the decision to the rules of professional
conduct.'" The Burns court noted that a lawyer must always be sensitive to the
rights and wishes of his client and must act carefully when making decisions that
involve disclosing information obtained in his professional capacity.' The court
further noted that "'[i]t is for the lawyer in his professional judgment to separate the
relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant."
''
17
The Burns court also indicated that portions of the Ohio Code of Professional
Responsibility are mandatory, while other parts are aspirational in character and
represent goals toward which "every member of the profession should strive.""' The
court reasoned that because defense counsel should not be required to choose
between violating his duty to his client and avoiding punishment for contempt, a trial
court must take care to enforce ethical considerations in matters before it."l The
policy behind these ethical considerations is to "'encourage[] laymen to seek early
legal assistance.'"'"
However, the Colorado Court of Appeals took a slightly different view in People
v. Salazar." In Salazar, a public defender withdrew from a case after receiving
evidence that incriminated another client in the crime.'" The public defender
refused to give the incriminating evidence to his former client's new attorney, and the
court ordered the public defender to disclose the nature of the information to the
court in camera." On appeal, the attorney contended that even private disclosure
of the client's information would violate the attorney-client privilege."'
The Salazar court noted that when the policies underlying the attorney-client
privilege conflict with other prevailing public policies, the attorney-client privilege
must give way.7 The attorney claimed that because the rule'" was discretionary
he had the option of deciding whether to reveal the information.'" The court
disagreed and stated that a discretionary interpretation would make a court order
167. Id. at 1209.
168. Id. at 1209-11.
169. Id. at 1209.
170. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980)).
171. Id. at 1210 (emphasis added).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1211 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBIUTY EC 4-1 (1980)).
174. 835 P.2d 592 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
175. Id. at 593.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 594.
179. Id. at 595 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONsIBIUTY DR 4-101(C)(2) (1980), which
states that "[a] lawyer may reveal ... confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules
or required by law or court order").
180. Id.
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meaningless.'"' The court concluded that an attorney must disclose information in
camera if ordered."
2. Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, entitled Confidentiality of Information,
reads:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of
a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
. (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense
to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based on
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to al-
legations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation
of the client."l
The model rule seems to be straightforward and clear at first glance. So why are
there so many cases in which one attorney seeks to obtain protected information from
another? Further, why are so many attorneys held in contempt by lower courts for
refusing to reveal such information? Perhaps part of the answer lies in the comments
to Rule 1.6.
As noted in Burns, a lawyer has an ethical obligation to protect the confidential
information of his client.'" Comment 2 to Rule 1.6 states that this ethical obligation
serves two purposes: (1) to ensure full development of the facts essential to proper
representation and (2) to encourage people to seek early legal assistance.'
Obviously, fewer people would take the opportunity to seek legal representation if
they knew that their attorney could disclose confidential information.
Other than the mandatory requirement in part (a) stating that a lawyer "shall not
disclose" certain information, Rule 1.6 allows broad discretion on the part of the
attorney to decide when to reveal information. The discretion whether to reveal
information includes the discretion to reveal the possible intent of the client to
commit a crime, where the commission of such crime would likely result in the
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 162-73.




imminent death of another."6 The comments suggest that because most clients
follow the advice of their attorney, the law is usually upheld.'"
The problem seems to arise from Comment 19 to Model Rule 1.6, which mandates
that attorneys comply with the final orders of a court or other tribunal of competent
jurisdiction."' Comment 19 seems to trump the general language and purpose
behind the rule.
3. State Versions of the Confidentiality Rule
While most states have adopted some form of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct,'" only five states have adopted Rule 1.6 verbatim."' Many of the
changes made to Rule 1.6 indicate that the state bar associations have slightly
different opinions as to how broad a lawyer's discretion should be in keeping
information confidential. The state bar associations of Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, New Jersey, Virginia, and Arizona have adopted versions of the rule that
indicate that an attorney should not have the broad discretion allowed in the model
rule. 9'
These states require attorneys to reveal information that is generally revealable at
the attorney's discretion. Five of these states mandate that the lawyer reveal the
information he reasonably believes is necessary to prevent the client from committing
a crime that might result in death or substantial bodily harm."" The Hawaii Code
of Professional Responsibility requires an attorney to reveal information that
establishes that the lawyer's services were used in the furtherance of a criminal or
fraudulent act.' The New Jersey and Hawaii rules mandate that attorneys reveal
the information necessary to rectify the consequences of a criminal or fraudulent act
where substantial injury occurred to the financial interests or property of another."'
The New Jersey Bar Association is the only bar to require specifically that
information be revealed to prevent the client from committing a criminal, illegal, or
fraudulent act that is likely to perpetrate a fraud on the tribunal.'5 Both Florida and
186. Id. at 1.6(b)(I).
187. Id. at 1.6 cmt. 3.
188. Id. at 1.6 cmt. 19.
189. See ABA/BNA MANUAL ON PROfeL CONDUCT 01:3 (1998) (State Ethics Rules). But see VA.
RULES OF PRtOF'L CONDUCT (2000).
190. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1996); DEL. LAWYER'S RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002); LA. RULES OF PRtOF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2000); MO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 (2001); MONT. RULES OF PROFeL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001).
191. See ARIZ. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1998); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6 (2001); FLA. RULES OF PROIeL CONDUCT R. 4-1.6 (1996); HAW. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6
(1994); ILL RULES OF PROVL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1993); N.J. RULES OF PROF*L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1996);
VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001).
192. See CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2001); FLA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R.
4-1.6(b) (1998); HAW. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1994); ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(b) (1993); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1994).
193. See HAW. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1994).
194. See id.; N.J. RULES OF PROFeL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(I) (1994).
195. See N.J. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (1994).
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Virginia go one step further and require attorneys to reveal any information
reasonably believed necessary to prevent a client from committing any crime."'
Oklahoma is the only state in which the professional responsibility code specifically
states that an attorney is required to reveal information when ordered by a court.'97
The states that require a lawyer to reveal information limit an attorney's ability to
weigh the confidential information of his clients and to protect the client in necessary
situations. However, several states give attorneys more flexibility in their discretion
to reveal information communicated in confidence. Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming allow an attorney to reveal his
client's intention to commit a crime even if there is no possibility of imminent death,
physical harm, or financial injury."
While the state versions of Rule 1.6 may explain certain judicial decisions, many
attorneys continue to appeal their state court's rulings to disclose information that the
attorney considers privileged. At least one state that has adopted Model Rule 1.6 has
modified their version to specifically address this issue."'" However, this may not
end the controversy. Thirteen states have specifically addressed revealing information
under court order.' In general, these states have added language to their rules
indicating that any attorney has the ability to reveal information relating to the
representation of his client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
comply with law or other court order." Why not simply make this a mandatory
part of the rules? Possibly, it is because the state bar associations take the position
that an attorney has the advantage of possessing the information and may need to
make a judgment call as to whether to reveal the client's identity.
This subjective standard may well be the reason that trial court orders to reveal a
client's identity are not readily followed by some attorneys. The individual lawyer
196. See FLA. RULES OF PROFeL CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(1) (1994); VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 (2001).
197. See OKLA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001).
198. See ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2001); COLO. RULES OF PROFL
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2001); IDAHO RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2001); IND. RULES OF PROFL
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1996); KAN. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2001); MICH. RULES
OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2002); Miss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1999); N.D. RULES
OF PROFeL CONDUCT R. 1.6(a), (d) (2001); OKLA. RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2001); S.C.
RULES OF PROFPL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1997); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFeL CONDUCT R. 1.05
(1998); WASH. RULES OF PROVL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2000); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b) (2000); Wyo. RULES OF PIIOF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2001).
199. See FLA. RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 4-1.6(d) (1998).
200. See HAW. RULES OF PROFeL CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1994); KAN. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT
R. 1.6(c)(6) (2001); KY. RULES OF PROFeL CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2001); MD. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (2002); MASS. RULES OF PROF*L CONDUCT (1998); MICH. RULES OF PROFL
CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(2) (2002); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(bX2) (1993); Miss. RULES OF
PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6(c).(1999); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(3) (1994); N.D. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(g) (2001); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.05(c)(4) (1998);
UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (1999); VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)
(2001).




may not believe that it is necessary to reveal his client's identity or may believe that
disclosure would be harmful to the client. The philosophy behind the attorney-client
privilege is to enable the attorney to have access to all relevant facts; the attorney is
in the best position to determine whether or not the client's identity needs protection.
If the lawyer indeed has all relevant information, he has the ability to determine
whether the client's identity could be determined in another manner, by another
source, or whether the client's identity is even necessary to ensure justice.
Florida makes the decision of whether to reveal a client's identity less burdensome
on its attorneys. Florida's rule on confidentiality of information provides: "When
required by a tribunal to reveal such [confidential] information, a lawyer may first
exhaust all appellate remedies."' This approach allows attorneys the full oppor-
tunity to argue for protecting information before revealing it to the court.
4. States Not Adopting the Model Rules
Only nine states have not adopted the current version of the model rules." These
states have adopted a code of professional responsibility based on canons of ethics
or another older version of the ABA rules. These codes are divided into three parts:
(1) canons, (2) ethical considerations, and (3) disciplinary rules.' The canons are
statements of norms that express the standard of professional conduct expected of
lawyers in their relationships with the..public, the legal system, and the legal
profession.' Ethical considerations are guidelines that all attorneys should strive
to follow.' The disciplinary rules state a minimum level of conduct below which
an attorney may be subject to disciplinary action."'
Under the canon that "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of
a Client,"' the ethical considerations denote the prevailing policies for protection
of the client information. These ethical considerations provide guidance and insight
as to why the disciplinary rules are stated as they are. In this sense, they are much
like the commentary section of the rules of the states adopting a version of the ABA
model rules.
One of the main differences between the disciplinary rules and the model rules
under the older Model Code is that the former protects the "confidences and secrets"
of the client' while the latter protects "information relating to the representation"
of the client.') In general, the disciplinary rule most similar to Model Rule 1.6 is
202. See FLA. RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY R. 4-1.6(d) (1998).
203. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2001); GA. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (2001);
IOWA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (2002); NEB. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (2002); N.Y.
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (2001); OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (2002); OR. CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (2001); TENN. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (2001); VT. CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY (2001).
204. See, e.g., IOWA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2002).
205. See sources cited supra note 203.
206, See sources cited supra note 203.
207. See sources cited supra note 203.
208. See sources cited supra note 203.
209. See sources cited supra note 203.
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).
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Rule 4-101, entitled Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client, which
reads:
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be likely to be detrimen-
tal to the client.
(B) Except where permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of
the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of
himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full
disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(I) Confidences or secrets with consent of the client or clients
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary
Rules or required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the infor-
mation necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences and secrets necessary to establish or collect his
fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an
accusation of wrongful conduct.
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees,
associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from disclosing
.or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may
reveal the information allowed by DR 4-101(C) through an employee."'
Although the disciplinary rules allow for disclosure upon consent, court order,
prevention of a crime, or collection of fees, they do mandate that the secrets of a
client not be revealed. This restriction addresses a concern of many attorneys,
especially those in a model state. Under Disciplinary Rule 4-101, an attorney is not
required to reveal his client's secrets. Thus, if a client had a reason to protect his
identity, then it would be secret and confidentially protected by the attorney.
However, the privilege does not protect all secrets.




IV. Alternative Ways to Decide Whether the Client's Identity
Should Be Protected
A. Problems with the Recognized Exceptions
The attorney-client privilege encourages a client to fully disclose all information
to his attorney. Because an attorney must be able to tell his client, with a reasonable
degree of certainty, which information will be confidential under the attorney-client
privilege, a test to determine when the privilege will attach must be very clear. '
A major problem with the standards and exceptions currently used by courts is the
confusion in application.
While Baird v. Koerner is often cited as precedent, there is a problem with citing
Baird, especially if it is a case of first impression in a jurisdiction. Courts have used
Baird to represent both the last-link and the confidential-communications exceptions.
In Baird, the court stated that a client's identity should be protected when "it may...
be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual
of a federal crime." ' However, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9 (MIA),2 '
the Eleventh Circuit qualified the Baird rule by stating:
[T]he last-link doctrine extends the protection of the attorney-client
privilege to nonprivileged information - the identity of the client -
when 'disclosure of that identity would disclose other, privileged
communications.., and when the incriminating nature of the privileged
communications has created in the client a reasonable expectation that
the information would be kept confidential.'
After this qualification, the court applied the confidential-communication standard
when it stated that "the client did not seek [the attorney's] legal advice reasonably
anticipating that his name would be kept confidential.""" The court then seemed
to completely abandon the last-link exception when, in requiring disclosure of the
client's identity, it stated that "[d]isclosure of the client's identity also will link the
client to the unidentified third party who arranged for the payment of attorney's
fees."2 ' The attorney argued that disclosing his client's identity would provide the
last link necessary to indict his client because it would reveal his client's relationship
with the target of the government's money laundering investigation.' The court
212. Ruth Lautt, Does the Attorney Client Privilege Extend to Client Identity and Fee Arran-
gements?, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1047, 1069-70.
213. Baird v. Koemner, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960).
214. 899 F.2d 1039 (11th Cir. 1990).
215. Id. at 1043 (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Rabin), 896 F.2d 1267, 1273 (11th Cir.
1990)). .
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1043-44.
218. Id. at 1044.
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contended, however, that disclosure of the client's identity would reveal nothing more
than a name, which was not protected by the attorney-client privilege.""
In In re Osterhoudt,' the court read the exception in Baird to say that "the
identification of the client [is] not within the privilege when the identification
'conveys information which ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual
privileged communication between attorney and client.'""' However, the court then
denied protection of the client's identity because it was not included in the substance
of the confidential communications. m In Osterhoudt, the client intervened to argue
that the requirements of the privilege are met whenever disclosure would provide the
information necessary to implicate the client in a criminal offense that was the topic
of the attorney's legal advice (i.e. last-link exception)., The court said, "That is
not the law."'
Neither the last-link nor the confidential-communication exception promotes the
underlying policy of the attorney-client privilege. As noted in an article promoting
the extension of the privilege:
An attorney could not credibly tell a client in an initial consultation,
the time when the client normally reveals his identity and sets fee
arrangements, that she can only avoid revealing that information if, in the
future, it is the "last link" in a chain of inculpatory information leading
to the client's prosecution. Nor can the attorney predict during initial
consultation, whether revealing the client's name ... will also reveal
other, confidential information.'
Clients will be reluctant to seek early legal assistance if they are unsure as to how
the attorney-client privilege will apply in their case.
B. Possible Protection Through the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is well recognized as a
personal privilege.' The rule that no man should be required to incriminate
himself has substantial bearing on the attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Fisher v. United States.'" In Fisher, the Court reasoned that
"'when the client himself would be privileged from production of the document,
either as a party at common law . . . or as exempt from self-incrimination, the
attorney having possession of the document is not bound to produce."'" The
question is whether the attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications
219. Id.
220. 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983).
221. Id. at 593 (quoting Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 1960)).
222. Id. at 594.
223. Id. at 593.
224. Id.
225. Lautt, supra note 212, at 1072.
226. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398 (1976).
227. Id.




in which the client would not have to answer under his Fifth Amendment privilege.
It seems that where the client can refuse to answer by claiming privilege from self-
incrimination, the attorney should be able to claim a Fifth Amendment privilege
through the attorney-client relationship. Additionally, the last-link exception gives
some indication that this view might be acceptable because the exception would
protect the client's identity if it would incriminate the client.
C. Client's Intent
Another alternative to using the traditional exceptions is to develop a test to
determine whether the client intended his identity to be kept confidential. Such a test
should be designed to avoid the misapplication of the exceptions. A set of factors
could be developed to determine whether, on the facts of the case, it was clear that
the client intended for his identity to be secret. Factors may include (I) statements
made by the client; (2) circumstances under which legal advice was sought; (3)
whether an attorney-client relationship existed; and (4) whether the client's intentions
to keep his identity protected qualifies as a protected communication. Courts could
then decide whether these factors should stand on their own or whether they should
be weighed against the public interest, which would be served if the name were
revealed.
D. Attorney Deference
Another possibility is to give greater deference to the attorney's professional
judgment as to whether revealing his client's identity would harm the client or
whether the client expected protection of his identity. When a decision in a case is
appealed, the abundance of facts and relevant information dwindle. Consequently,
much of the relevant information that the client reveals to the attorney is unavailable
for appellate review. Given the freedom that most clients feel to share openly with
their attorney, the attorney is in the best position to determine whether the client's
identity should be disclosed. This is the prevailing view among the state bar
associations as seen in the broad discretion available under the state rules of
professional conduct.
V. Specific Implication for Oklahoma
A. The Rule in Oklahoma
Oklahoma has made several alterations in its version of the model rules.
Oklahoma's Rule 1.6, entitled Confidentiality of Information, reads:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of
a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).
(b) A lawyer may reveal, to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary, information relating to the representation of a client:
(1) to disclose the intention of the client to commit a crime and
the information necessary to prevent the crime;
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(2) to rectify the consequences of what the lawyer knows to be
a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the
lawyer's services had been used, provided that the lawyer has first
made reasonable efforts to contact the client but has been unable to
do so, or that the lawyer has contacted and called upon the client to
rectify such criminal or fraudulent act but the client has refused or
is unable to do so;
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense
to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to al-
legations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation
or the client;
(4) or as otherwise permitted under these Rules.
(c) A lawyer shall reveal such information when required by law or
court order.'
The Oklahoma version of Rule 1.6 differs from the model rule in several respects.
First, the Oklahoma version gives the attorney the ability to reveal the intent of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent its occurrence.'
Under the model rule, an attorney can only reveal such information that the lawyer
believes is reasonably necessary to prevent his client from committing a criminal act
that is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.f" Oklahoma's
rule allows attorneys to intercept and prevent more crimes than does the model rule.
Additionally, attorneys in Oklahoma can do so without violating their professional
obligation to their client.
Second, a lawyer in Oklahoma can reveal information necessary to rectify
consequences of his client's criminal or fraudulent acts if the attorney's services were
used, provided that the attorney gives his client the opportunity to first'rectify the
situation.' 2 This modification allows the attorney to correct the situations in which
his services were used against society without his knowledge. Additionally, it is
probable that fewer criminals will purposefully and wrongfully use the information
acquired from their attorneys if they are aware that the attorney has the ability to
disclose the information.
Finally, Oklahoma's rule provides that attorneys must reveal information when
required by law or court order."3 This last modification sheds light on why
Oklahoma and the Tenth Circuit are not overflowing with attorneys claiming that the
attorney-client privilege extends to their clients' identities.
229. OKLA. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001).
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B. Implications from Case Law
In 1990, the Tenth Circuit decided In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Anderson).'
a case on appeal from the Northern District of Oklahoma. While Anderson dealt with
the issue of protecting the identity of individuals who paid several attorneys' legal
fees, it provides insight as to how Oklahoma courts and the Tenth Circuit might
decide the issue of protection of a client's identity.
In Anderson, the trial court held the attorneys in contempt and placed them in jail
because they refused to reveal the source of payment of legal fees incurred while
representing clients on drug charges." The attorneys claimed that the attorney-
client privilege covered the information requested, even though the attorneys did not
claim that the individuals paying their fees were clients.'
The court addressed the issue of the attorney-client privilege and the recognized
exceptions in other jurisdictions." 7 The Tenth Circuit noted three exceptions to the
general rule that the identity of a client and the source of payment for legal fees are
not included in the attorney-client privilege.2"
The court first noted a legal-advice exception, which protects client identity and
fee information "where there is a strong probability that disclosure would implicate
the client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought."'' While
recognizing this exception, the Anderson court did not decide whether to adopt the
exception because it did not apply to the case at bar.' The court stated that this
exception did not apply because the attorneys did not claim that the individuals
paying their fees were clients."
The court next recognized the last-link exception. The Tenth Circuit noted that
the Jones court, in relying on Baird, developed a new form of the last-link exception,
which was later refined in Pavlick.N) The Anderson court stated that it believed the
confidential-communication exception represents a more "disciplined interpretation"
of Baird than does the last-link interpretation.' The court stated that it rejected the
last-link exception where it departs from the holding in Baird.' The Anderson
court did adopt the confidential-communication exception.' It held that "an
exception to the general rule that a client's identity is not privileged exists in the
234. 906 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990).
235. Id at 1487.
236. Id. at 1487, 1489.
237. Id at 1488.
238. Id.
239. Id The legal-advice exception is used interchangeably with the substantial-disclosure exception.
240. Id.
241. Id at 1488-89.
242. Id. at 1489.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1492.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1491.
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situation where the disclosure of the client's identity would be tantamount to
disclosing an otherwise protected confidential communication.""
In Anderson, the attorneys also argued that the government must attempt to secure
the information from alternative sources before issuing attorney subpoenas.' The
court did not address this issue; instead, it relied on two previously decided cases to
find that the government must show a proper purpose and relevance to a grand jury
investigation before subpoenaing attorneys.'
Additionally, the court noted that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to impose a maximum sentence for contempt when the attorneys refused to
comply with the court order.' The court indicated that confinement in a contempt
case is used to coerce testimony." The court gave the attorneys the opportunity to
comply with the court order, and they refusedY" This case sheds light on the
possible interpretation by Oklahoma courts. It is conceivable from Anderson that if
confronted with the issue of protection of client identity in the future, an Oklahoma
court relying on this Tenth Circuit case would at least recognize the confidential-
communication exception.
In viewing Oklahoma's version of the model rules, it appears unquestioned that an
attorney is required by Rule 1.6(c) to reveal his client's identity when ordered to do
so by a court. It further appears that his only salvation on appeal may be to establish
a confidential-communication exception to the rule. Additionally, the legal-advice
exception may work if the attorney asserts that the information sought to be protected
is that of a client. However, because the Tenth Circuit did not address the issue of
whether it would adopt the legal-advice exception, uncertainty exists as to whether
the client's identity would be protected under this exception in Oklahoma.
The possibility of protecting the client's identity through the Fifth Amendment's
self-incrimination clause is unlikely in Oklahoma because the Tenth Circuit has
rejected the part of the last-link doctrine in its application to the incrimination of a
client. As such, it is doubtful that an Oklahoma court would hold that an attorney
could claim the self-incrimination privilege on behalf of his client in the same way
that he can currently claim the attorney-client privilege on his client's behalf.
Practitioners should note that the decision in Anderson may set precedent for
decisions regarding the disclosure of a client's identity. It appears that there will be
very few circumstances in Oklahoma where a court will allow the protection of the
client's identity. A court may require that the client specifically tell the attorney that
he does not want his identity revealed. Such a statement may indicate that the client
considers his identity part of the confidential communication he is revealing to his
attorney.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1495.
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However, even in this situation, a court may require the attorney to disclose his
clients identity. The attorney must convince the court that the identity is at the core
of the confidential information sought, and that, with its disclosure, the substance of
the communication with the client would also be disclosed. Even if the attorney
successfully presents his view to the court, the court may require him to reveal the
information. Under the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, the attorney must
disclose this information if ordered. An Oklahoma court may decide that the public
interest served by discovering the client's identity outweighs the protection and, thus,
requires disclosure, even if the situation appears to the attorney to require his
complete silence on the matter. Because the court in Anderson saw no abuse of
discretion in imposing heavy sanctions for contempt, the Oklahoma attorney should
also keep this in mind when his conclusion is contrary to the court's decision.
VI. Conclusion
Generally, the attorney-client privilege does not protect a client's identity. The
policy behind this rule is that the subject matter of the communications is to be
protected and not the identity of the client. Public consensus indicates a desire for
everyone to know who is acting in a way that is detrimental to him or to society.
However, if an attorney is not allowed to use his professional judgment to determine
whether the client's identity should be protected, clients might be less willing to
communicate freely with their attorneys in fear that such communications will
become public.
Open communication allows the attorney to better protect the interests of the public
at large. It may be more dangerous for clients to keep information from their
attorneys because they are not afforded the full protection of the law. This may
motivate clients to take matters into their own hands instead of consulting an attorney
to advise them of the correct (legal and moral) action to take. Protection of a client's
identity is especially important when the client had no part in the alleged illegality
but has relevant information. If these clients are concerned about possible harm to
themselves or their families, they may not reveal the information to the attorney if
the attorney cannot guarantee that the client's identity will remain undisclosed.
Additionally, if criminal clients cannot rely on the privacy of attorney-client
communication, few who are guilty of a crime will come forward if they have not
yet been charged.
The attorney-client privilege is very important to ensure that everyone has an
opportunity to receive competent representation. If an attorney is unsure as to which
test a court will use in order to determine whether a client's identity may be
concealed, how can the attorney provide his clients with complete information
regarding his representation? State bar associations should consider alternative
amendments to their version of Rule 1.6 to better inform attorneys of the nature of
the protection allowed in their state.
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